Principles for Application of the
Harmless Error Standard
-In recent years, the Supreme Court has applied two different standards of review to criminal cases in which a federal constitutional right
of the defendant was violated. The Court has failed, however, to announce a coherent rationale as to which violations are to be reviewed
by the strict "automatic reversal" standard and which by the more
lenient "harmless error" standard. This failure has deprived the lower
courts of guidance for judging types of violations not yet treated by
the Supreme Court.1 The selection of the standard is often decisive;
under the "automatic reversal" standard proof of the violation is sufficient to require reversal, while under the "harmless error" standard
the appellant must demonstrate in addition that the outcome of his case
was affected by the violation.
The first section of this comment will describe the pressures on the
traditional, "automatic reversal" standard of review that were created
by the recent expansion of constitutional protections accorded criminal
defendants and led to the establishment of the harmless error standard.
The second section will attempt to define and evaluate factors the
Court has employed in determining which standard to apply.2 The
final section offers a way to integrate these factors and apply them to
particular constitutional protections.
1 For example, the lower federal courts have split over whether a denial of cross-examination should be judged by the harmless error standard. Compare United States v.
Alston, 460 F.2d 48, 54 (5th Cir. 1972), and United States v. Long, 449 F.2d 288, 296 (8th
Cir. 1971), with Phillips v. Neil, 452 F.2d 337, 349 (6th Cir. 1971).
2 Commentators have suggested various rationales by which protection of a criminal
defendant's constitutional rights may be allocated between these two standards of review.
See, e.g., Cameron & Osborn, When Harmless Error Isn't Harmless, 1971 LAw & Soc. 0.
23 (1971); Manse, Harmless Constitutional Error. The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. Rav. 519 (1969); Note, Harmless Constitutional Error: A Reappraisal,
83 HAv. L. Ray. 814 (1970) [hereinafter cited as A Reappraisal]; Note, Harmless Constitutional Error,20 STAN. L. Rav. 83 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Harmless Error]; Comment,
A Multi-Rule Approach to Harmless ConstitutionalError, 18 U.C.LA.L. REv. 202 (1970);
Note, Harmless Constitutional Error,30 U. Pirt. L. R v. 553 (1969). The Court, however,
has continued to decide the standard of appellate review on a case by case basis, building
a system by an intensive consideration of various factors present in each decision rather
than by announcing a single, complete system for categorizing all constitutional safeguards.
For a discussion of the process of review under various harmless error rules, see R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARmLass ERROR 43 (1970).

Application for Harmless Error
I. TiHE HIsToRICAL BACKGROUND
The Traditional Standard of Review: Automatic Reversal
Well into the twentieth century, any violation of a defendant's fed3
eral constitutional rights in state or federal proceedings led to reversal.
The federal courts offered very little justification for this stringent
doctrine, 4 which was frequently criticized. 5 The rule did not create any
great burden, however, on the federal judiciary. Relatively few criminal cases were tried in the federal courts,6 and the rights of a defendant
in state court, where most prosecutions occurred, were relatively narrow
in scope.7 Constitutional violations were found in state court proceedings only if the state violated "fundamental fairness."" Thus in both
the federal and state courts, the automatic reversal standard led to few
9
reversals. In 1919 Congress enacted a "harmless error" statute that
A.

3 See authorities cited supra note 2; Note, CriminalProcedure-Self-IncriminationHarmless Error,69 MICH. L.Rv. 941, 942 n.10 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Procedure].
See also Gibbs, PrejudicialError: Admissions and Exclusions of Evidence in the Federal
Courts, 3 ViLL. L REv. 48, 49 (1957). It is important to note that this was prior to "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, and broader federal
constitutional rights were available to the defendant in federal court than in a state court.
See text and notes at notes 6-8 infra. By 1967, however, automatic reversal for nonconstitutional errors had been rejected by both state and federal courts. See text and notes at
notes 9-11 infra.
4 Rationales offered tended to be simplistic. For example, the Supreme Court held that
the illegal admission of a statement by the defendant will result in reversible error, "since
and on the other
the prosecution cannot on one hand offer evidence to prove guilt ...
hand for the purpose of avoiding the consequences of the error ... be heard to assert
that the matter offered as a confession was not prejudicial because it did not tend to prove
guilt." Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 541 (1897).
5 See, e.g., 1 J. WGMoaE, EvmENcE § 21 (3d ed. 1940); State v. Crawford, 96 Minn. 95,
104 N.W. 822 (1905); Lipscomb v. State, 75 Miss. 559, 617, 23 So. 210, 228 (1898) (Whitfield,
J., dissenting); State v. Musgrave, 43 W. Va. 672, 710, 28 S.E. 813, 828-29 (1897) (Brannon, J.,
dissenting).
a See generally F. GRAHAM, THE DUE PRocEss RVOLUTION 29 (1970).
7 The procedural guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights were considered restrictions
on federal power only. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). See F. GRAHAM,
supra note 6, at 26-36. The fourteenth amendment increased the scope of permissible federal regulation of the states, but was held not to embody the guarantees of the Bill of

Rights. Palko v. Connecticut, 802 U.S. 319 (1937); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908); Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
8 The phrase is from Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161
(1951) (Frankfurter J., concurring). This test has been stated in a variety of ways since
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., "Does it violate those 'fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions?'" Palko v. Connecticut, 802 U.S. 319, 828 (1987) (Cardozo, J.). See also F. GRAHAM,
supra note 6, at 33-36.
9 Now 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1970); FED. R. C~iM. P. 52(a). The 1919 act was repealed in
1949 and reenacted without any significant differences. See Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error,59 VA. L. REv. 988, 1000 n.57; cf. FEn. R. Crv. P. 61.
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permitted the affirmance of a conviction if the error did not affect the
defendant's "substantial" rights. This statute did not specify the type
of error to be judged by harmless error but provided that the courts
should not reverse if the error was technical and did not have great
effect on the outcome of the case. The federal statute was interpreted as
applying only to nonconstitutional errors,10 but many states adopted
statutes that created a harmless error standard for both constitutional
and nonconstitutional state rights."1
B.

The Development of a Federal Harmless Error Standard for Constitutional Violations
The Supreme Court in the 1960s broadened both the scope of criminal defendants' constitutional rights and the application of these protections to state trials. The strains these developments placed on the
automatic reversal doctrine rapidly became apparent. Attacks on state
convictions inundated federal and state appellate courts, and the federal and some state courts, applying the automatic reversal rule, began
to reverse a large number of state convictions.112 Some state appellate
courts, however, applied state harmless error rules to challenges based
on these "new" constitutional rights.18 The Supreme Court ruled on
the propriety of this weaker standard in Chapman v. California.14
The constitutional violation in Chapman consisted of prosecutorial
comments to the jury on the defendant's failure to take the stand in
his own defense. 15 The right violated was one of the new constitutional
rights that appeared in the "due process revolution" of the 1960s.18
The California Supreme Court, applying the state harmless error rule, 17
held the error harmless. 18 The United States Supreme Court stated
10 See note 5 supra. This situation is discussed in United States v. Lee, 489 F.2d 1242
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
11 By 1967, all the states had adopted a harmless error rule by statute. See Chapman v.
California, 886 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
12 See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. CH. L. REv. 142 (1970). See generally R. TRAYNOR, Tim DEVILS OF DUE PROCESS IN
CiuMiNAL DEracNON, DErEN'rION, AND TRIAL (1966).
13 At least thirty state courts had used their harmless error rules for new constitutional
violations. See Note, Harmless Error,supra note 2, at 86 n.30.
14 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
15 In accordance with a provision of the state constitution, CAL. CONsr. art. I, § 13, the
prosecutor commented extensively on the defendant's failure to take the stand.
16 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
17 This rule was a provision of the state constitution, CAL. CONsr. art. VI, § 4V2, which
forbade reversal unless the reviewing court was convinced "that the error complained of
has resulted in a miscarriage of justice."
18 People v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 404 P.2d 209, 45 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1965), rev'd sub nom.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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that a harmless error rule did apply to the review of certain constitutional violations occurring in either state or federal courts including the violation at issue, and held the error in Chapman not harmless.' 9
The standard enunciated was more stringent than that used by most
states. The typical state rule allowed an appellate court to sustain a
conviction if that court found that, despite the constitutional error,
the record disclosed "overwhelming evidence" in support of the result.2 0 The Supreme Court had previously criticized this overwhelming

evidence standard, 21 and in Chapman the Court held that a violation
could, "consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless"
only if the reviewing court could "declare the belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 2'1 2 Not all errors, however, were to be
treated under the harmless error standard; the Court was careful to
note that "there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial
,,.*"23
that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error .
The Chapman rule represented a compromise between the strict
automatic reversal standard and the loose overwhelming evidence tests
of the states. Critics attacked this compromise position for the inadequacies of its theoretical legal base,' 4 for the ambiguity left by the
failure of the Court to enunciate the parameters of the rule's application,2 5 and for the practical failings of the doctrine, which was still far
more stringent than the overwhelming evidence rule.2 61 In Harrington
v. California,27 the Court responded to some of the practical problems
by shifting the standard of review under the harmless error test to allow
affirmance of convictions that are supported by overwhelming untainted
19 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
20 Id. at 23; see People v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 197, 404 P.2d 209, 220, 45 Cal. Rptr. 729,
740 (1965).
21 Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
22 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
23 Id. at 23, citing as examples Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confession), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 385 (1963) (right to counsel), and Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1927) (impartial judge).
24 See generally Mause, supra note 2, at 527-33.
25 Mr. Justice Stewart attempted to state certain types of cases where he thought that
automatic reversal was required, but expressed no particular rationale. 386 U.S. 18, 42-44
(1967) (concurring opinion). The resulting uncertainty about the status of the automatic
reversal rule has been described as the "Chapman ambiguity" in Mause, supra note 2, at
26. Some commentators assumed because of the strictness of the rule that the scope of
the federal harmless error rule was quite limited. See generally authorities cited supra note
2.
26 It was suggested that if the rule of Chapman were honestly applied, there would be
few cases in which there would be any difference between applying it and applying the

automatic reversal rule. See Thompson,- UnconstitutionalSearch and Seizure and the Myth
of Harmless Error,43 NoTRa DAmE LAw. 457 (1967).
27

395 U.S. 250 (1969).
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evidence. This new standard was essentially a return to the harmless
error standard employed by the states before Chapman.28 The Court
in Harringtonreaffirmed that a harmless error standard should not be
applied to all constitutional errors, but again failed to define which
errors were subject to the rule.29 Analysis of the Court's decisions since
Chapman does reveal, however, the factors the Court has employed in
distinguishing the "harmless error" safeguards from the "automatic
reversal" safeguards.80

II.

DETERMINING THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

The factors that suggest use of the automatic reversal standard are
the fundamentality of the right in question and the deterrent value of a
strict approach. The factor favoring use of the harmless error standard
is the cost of retrial, including the cost of possibly freeing guilty persons.
A.

Factors Supporting the Automatic Reversal Standard

Where the automatic reversal standard is applied to violations of a
particular right, retrying cases that might have withstood appeal if
harmless error had been applied places a heavy burden on state and
federal courts. The automatic reversal rule is significantly more severe
than the harmless error rule, and its application implies that the constitutional violation in question is considered so important to the fabric
of justice as to require this especially burdensome rule. The Court ap-

pears to have been influenced by two factors in requiring application
of this strict standard: the fundamentality of the right and the need for
deterring unconstitutional behavior.
1. The Fundamentality of the Right. The fundamentality of a right
depends upon its importance in the system of justice. Some commenta28 Id. at 254.
29 Id. Some courts, even before Harrington,had applied the overwhelming evidence test.
See, e.g., Whitsell v. Perini, 419 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Barnes, 383 F.2d.
287 (6th Cir. 1967). Some confusion about which standard is to be applied still persists.
See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 438 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
Courts often cite Chapman and apply the overwhelming evidence standard without explanation. See, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Evans, 484 F.2d 1178 (2d Cir.
1973).
80 The constitutional guarantees that are the concern of this question are those which
in the past decade have been imposed by the Supreme Court as necessary procedural safeguards. They concern almost all stages of the criminal process and include protection from
unreasonable search and seizure, the guarantee against double jeopardy, and protection
from introduction at trial of coerced confessions and from generally coercive police conduct. A defendant is guaranteed an impartial trier of fact and an impartially selected jury,
counsel at certain trials and at all important stages of the criminal process, confrontation
of witnesses and the right to cross-examine, and a speedy trial. The constitutionally required burden of proof is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

1974]

Application for Harmless Error

tors have suggested that application of the automatic reversal rule
should depend on whether the violation taints the basic accuracy of the
trial process. 31 Almost all constitutional safeguards, however, may be
considered desirable for accurate adjudication,3 2 and this test is therefore not very useful.33 In determining whether a right is fundamental,
the Court has focused more on factors that indicate a general societal
belief in its importance to the system of criminal justice: the extent to
which the guarantee is explicitly provided by the constitution, statutory provisions that indicate the importance of the right, and the
history of judicial attitudes towards the right.
a. Explicitness of the ConstitutionalGuarantee.The Court appears
to be disinclined to dilute a right plainly set forth in language of the
Constitution. The ease of identification, the minimal need for judicial
construction, and the clarity of the boundaries of the protection characterize this class of rights. The guarantee against double jeopardy 34
is an example of a highly explicit safeguard. In Price v. Georgia35 the
Court rejected a claim that a violation of this safeguard was harmless
error. The defendant in Price had been tried for murder and was convicted of the lesser-included-offense of manslaughter. After a reversal
of that conviction, the defendant was retried for murder and was again
found guilty of manslaughter. Georgia claimed that the retrial for murder, although double jeopardy, was harmless error under Chapman because the defendant was convicted of the lesser crime and thus suffered
no greater punishment at his second trial.
Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger stressed the
explicit nature of the right and strongly asserted that a violation of this
right-"cast in terms of the risk or hazard of trial conviction, not of
the ultimate consequences of the verdict" 36-could never be harmless.
31 See Note, A Reappraisal,supra note 2. Mause similarly suggests automatic reversal for
those errors that have an inherent tendency to undermine the reliability of the guilt-determination process. See Mause, supra note 2.
32 Examples of constitutional safeguards that have little bearing on the accuracy of
the trial include the right to reasonable bail, the protection from unreasonable search and
seizure, the protection from double jeopardy, and the requirements of the Miranda warnings.
33 Commentators have argued that the extent to which the error is likely to taint the
accuracy of the fact determination should be the basis of the determination of which standard to use. See, e.g., Mause, supra note 2; Note, Harmless Error, supra note 2. In the
analysis presented in this comment, this factor appears as an element of the historical role
of the protection, see text and notes at notes 54-60 infra, and a factor influencing the
desirability of using the harmless error standard to conserve judicial resources, see text
and notes at notes 69-79 infra.
be subject for the same offense to be
34 U.S. CoNsr. amend. V: "No person shall ...
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.
35 398 U.S. 323 (1970).
36 Id. at 331. Much the same thing could be said for protection from unreasonable
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The Court noted that the Georgia Supreme Court had refused direct
review of the second conviction and had transferred the case to the
Georgia Court of Appeals with the statement that "[o]nly questions as
to the application of plain and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution of the United States... [were] involved, ' 37 and that direct review by the Georgia Supreme Court was reserved for cases requiring
38
construction of the Constitution.
The effect of explicitness is also demonstrated by the standard used
to review a denial of the defendant's right "to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence" in "all criminal prosecutions."8 9 At a minimum it is clear that the defendant is entitled to counsel at trial; to
this extent the safeguard is relatively explicit. 40 Violation of this basic
part of the safeguard is thus worthy of automatic reversal. 41 The right
to counsel, however, has been expanded to include the right to the
assistance of counsel at preliminary police proceedings. 42 Requiring
counsel at each significant step in the criminal process reduces the
explicitness of the right. "Defense" becomes an expanded concept that
includes far more than advocacy in the courtroom. However supportable as a matter of policy, this aspect of the right to counsel is not
highly explicit. For violations of the extensions of the right to counsel,
arising out of but not explicitly found in the sixth amendment, harmless error is the appropriate standard of review. 43 The right to counsel
thus presents a relatively explicit core right subject to the automatic reversal standard and a set of expanded rights of lesser explicitness sub44
ject to the harmless error standard.
The degree of explicitness is obviously an appropriate means of desearch and seizure, however, which describes the right in terms of protection and not ultimate legal consequences.
37 Id. at 325.

38 GA.CONsT. art. VI, § 2 4.
39 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
40 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 453 (1938).
41 In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the Court extended the right to counsel
to misdemeanor cases which result in imprisonment. The Court observed, "Under the
rule we announce today, every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts
that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused
is represented by counsel." Id. at 40. The language of the Court would not seem to leave
room for considerations of prejudice. Denial of counsel at trial was one of the suggested
automatic reversals mentioned in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 43 (1967) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
42 See, e.g., United states v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
43 In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), the Court recognized the right to counsel at post-indictment lineups. It then remanded the case for a determination of whether
the error was harmless. Id. at 224. See also United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (ineffectiveness of counsel).
44 Counsel is required at preliminary hearings, but denial is subject to review by the
harmless error rule. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1969).
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termining which protections are considered fundamental to the American system of criminal justice. The protections recently derived by implication are undoubtedly important, but the very fact that they are
of recent development indicates that they are not regarded as part of
the core of the fair administration of justice. That many of the explicit
rights have only recently been applied to state proceedings does not
dilute the importance of those rights; the recent application of Bill of
Rights protections to the states has been due to a development in federalism, not a change in what is regarded as fundamental.
b. CongressionalWill. The Court has recently demonstrated a tendency to use automatic reversal for guarantees deemed important in an
46
expression of congressional will.45 For example, in Peters v. Kiff, a
defendant challenged his conviction on the grounds that the grand and
petty jury selection process systematically excluded Blacks. The defendant contended that this exclusion violated the equal protection
and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment and was against
the policy of Congress as expressed by a criminal statute forbidding
discriminatory selection of jurors. The state argued that since the defendant was white and the charge had no racial connotations, the
defendant suffered no prejudice, and the error did not warrant reversal.
In a 3-3-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction. Justice Marshall, for the Court, rested his decision entirely on his belief
that the use of a discriminatorily selected jury violates traditional notions of due process. Justice White, however, in the concurrence necessary to the judgment, stressed the fact that a congressional antidiscrimination statute proved the importance of the right. He noted that the
"majestic generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment" were reduced
to a concrete statutory command 47 and that, although the generally
accepted view of due process derived from Court decisions would have
compelled the rejection of petitioner's claim for lack of standing, the
"better view" was to implement the "strong statutory policy ... which
reflects the central concern of the Fourteenth Amendment with racial
.48', The clear implication was that once the dediscrimination .
was
fendant was given standing, proof of the constitutional violation
49
sufficient for the defendant to obtain reversal of his conviction.
45 This approach was suggested in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65
(1946). See also Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939).
46 407 U.S. 493 (1972). The sixth amendment did not apply in that case since the trial
occurred before Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). See De Stefano v. Woods, 392
U.S. 631 (1968).
47 407 U.S. 493, 506 (1972), quoting Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 251, 282-83 (1947).
48 407 U.S. at 506 (1972).
49 The three dissenters did not argue that it was improper to make this determination
on the basis of Congressional directives, but stated that reliance on the policy of this
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Although the views of three concurring justices fall far short of
demonstrating a conclusive Supreme Court trend, examination of
congressional views is appropriate for determining whether a particular
right should be viewed as fundamental to the criminal justice system.
It cannot be argued that Congress could remove from the automatic
reversal rule a right that otherwise should be covered by it; as the
Court has noted in other areas, however, it is appropriate that Congress
should be able to increase the scope of the protections of the fourteenth
amendment 4 0 A federal statute is a signal, although not a command,
that the right it seeks to protect should be given the strict protection
afforded by the automatic reversal rule. 51
c. Historical Significance. Strong evidence of fundamentality is
also provided where the right in question was recognized at an early date
to be necessary in the federal system. This evidence is augmented in that
the right was applied to the states under the concept of "fundamental
fairness." 52 The use of the automatic reversal rule for these rights was
first suggested in Chapman and has been followed in subsequent de53
cisions.
The prohibition against coerced confessions is an example of such a
protection. From an early period, the introduction into evidence of an
statute would be misplaced. Id. at 507. The statute, they argued, was passed in 1875 for
the purpose of making "explicit . . . that persons could not be denied jury service on
the basis of race... and to provide criminal penalties for persons violating the statutory
command." Id. at 512. They argued that the statute was representative only of a policy
of protecting the rights of prospective jurors, and was not invocable by a defendant, because it had nothing to do with the propriety of the verdict.
50 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648--53 (1966).
51 Lower courts have taken the case generally on the constitutional interpretation rather
than restricting the case to racial discrimination. For example, a male can now object to
a systematic exclusion of women from the jury in a murder case. Mayfield v. Steed, 473
F.2d 691 (8th Cir. 1973); cf. People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 753-54, 497 P.2d 1121, 1151,
102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 414-15 (1972), cert. denied, 410 US. 947 (1973).
52 See text and note at note 8 supra.
53 386 U.S. 18, 42-45 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Stewart made the suggestion on the basis of a long line of cases in which the Court had rejected any idea
that these errors could be harmless. His examples were Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 385
(1963) (counsel at trial), Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confession), and
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (bias in trier of fact). Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting,
thought that harmless error was an independent state ground of decision, but agreed that
no harmless error should be allowed for those types of violations. 386 U.S. 18, 52 n.7 (1967).
State courts have suggested that the new procedural safeguards come under the harmless
error rule, e.g., "the constitutional doctrine of those cases were not given retrospective application, apparently for the reason that a violation may occur without necessarily affecting the fundamental fairness of the trial. Due process in the traditional sense is not necessarily denied the accused. . . . Hence, the rule of 'automatic reversal' does not control
appellate disposition." Guyette v. State, 84 Nev. 160, 167, 438 P.2d 244, 248 (1968).
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involuntary confession was constitutional error whether the error occurred in federal or in state court, and the error has consistently been
reviewed under the automatic reversal standard.54
It is clear that the historical examples set out in Chapman do not exhaust the rights traditionally viewed as fundamental to the system of
justice. A safeguard unmentioned in Chapman is the right to cross-examination, which was established early as a constitutional right in the
federal system.5 5 Although never imposed on the states as an element
of fundamental fairness, the safeguard found expression in analogous
provisions in many states.5 6 Before Chapman, the Court maintained that
"a denial of cross-examination without waiver . . would be a constitutional error of the first magnitude, and no amount of showing of
lack of prejudice would cure it."57 In the post-Chapman case of Smith
v. Illinois, the Court reaffirmed that language, 58 noting the long history
of the right 50 and explicitly following the traditional reasoning that to
require a showing of prejudice would be to "deny a substantial right
and withdraw one of the safeguards essential for a fair trial." 60
Historical tradition would be an inappropriate factor if it were followed merely for its own sake. In the treatment of constitutional errors,
54

Until 1967, with one exception, all constitutional errors were reversed without dis-

cussion of harmless error. See Note, Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 942 n.10.
55

Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931); Nailor v. Williams, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 107,

109 (1868).
56 See generally Note, Confrontation, Cross-Examination, and the Right to Prepare a
Defense, 56 GEo. L.J. 939, 959-65 (1968). See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 130
(1934) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
57 Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966). Cross-examination may be constitutionally restricted to protect the safety of the witness. United States v. Crovedi, 467 F.2d 1032 (7th
Cir. 1972). Lower courts have imposed various other restrictions on the right of crossexamination. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Abbott v. Twomey, 460 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 852 (1969); United States v. Lee, 413 F.2d 910 (7th
Cir. 1969); United States v. Lawler, 413 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Teller,
412 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 949 (1971). A few lower courts have intimated that a denial could be harmless error. United States v. Alston, 460 F.2d 48 (5th
Cir. 1972) (alternative holding; no error found but if error it would be harmless); United
States v. Jordan, 466 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1972). Only one case seems to be willing to hold a
denial of cross-examination as harmless. United States v. Long, 449 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1971).
58 390 U.S. 129, 131 (1968).
59 The Court said "it cannot seriously be doubted at this late date that the right of
cross-examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront
the witnesses against him." Id. at 131, quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 404 (1965). Referring to the fact that "almost 40 years ago" the safeguard was reaffirmed in the federal
system, the Court found that the theory then expressed remained cogent. Smith v. Illinois,
390 U.S. 129, 132 (1968).
00 Brooklhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 8 (1966); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692
(1931).
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however, tradition serves the important function of isolating those
rights that have been considered fundamental to the concept of justice.
2. Deterrence of Unconstitutional Behavior. A major goal of the
strict automatic reversal rule is to deter unconstitutional judicial, prosecutorial, or police conduct by voiding any conviction where the prohibited behavior has occurred. Although many consider the social cost
of this policy too high,61 automatic reversal remains an accepted deterrent. 62 The effectiveness of the automatic reversal standard may depend
largely on the group it is to deter. The deterrent is generally considered most effective when directed at prosecutorial or judicial conduct, which is easy to channel and review, and less effective when aimed
at police behavior.63 Both judges and prosecutors can be expected to
understand the significance of the automatic reversal standard. Thus,
for example, deterrence would be highly effective in preserving rights
such as the double jeopardy protection, the guarantee of counsel, the
right to a speedy trial, and the right to cross-examination. Police are
more likely to view their main duty as preventing crime and arresting
criminals, rather than obtaining a valid conviction.6 4 Using the automatic reversal standard instead of the harmless error standard may
therefore have little deterrent effect on errant police.
Most commentary on the harmless error rule has assumed that the
desire to control police behavior would be a factor pulling the Court
toward the automatic reversal standard.6 5 Recent opinions indicate that
at least some members of the Court may be rejecting the use of appellate review as a deterrent device. In Bivens v. Six Unknown, Named
Narcotics Agents, 66 for example, Chief Justice Burger made a scathing

attack on the inadequacies of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent device, 67 noting the high social cost and limited effectiveness of excluding
reliable evidence.6 8 A similar reaction might be expected to the automatic reversal rule as a deterrent of police behavior. To the extent that
it controls prosecutorial and judicial behavior, however, the deterrent
effect of appellate review should continue to be a factor.
61 In that it frees the guilty because the law offcers have made a mistake. See generally
authorities and cases cited supra note 5.
62 See generally authorities cited supra note 2.
63 See Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later, 61 MIcH. L. REv. 219 (1962).
64 See F. GRAHAM, supra note 6, at 130-52.

65 See Note, Criminal Procedure,supra note 3, at 954-57.
66 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
67 Id. at 411-27 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
68 See text and notes at notes 74-75 infra. The same sort of argument could be made in
regard to the effectiveness of the Miranda requirements. See F. GRAInAm, supra note 6,
at 280-81.
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Factors Favoring the Harmless Error Standard

The Court has recognized that society cannot ensure perfection, even
in the application of constitutional guarantees: "[a] defendant is entitled to a fair trial, but not a perfect one."' 9 This approach becomes
particularly important when the imperfection is one that can be caused
even by well-intentioned officials, but does not inherently compromise
the accuracy of the trial process. In such a situation, a strict approach
to constitutional violations imposes intolerable costs on society. Reversal entails both the direct expense of a retrial and the social cost of freeing guilty men because of the difficulty of reconstructing a stale case. If
the overwhelming evidence below supports a conviction, and the violation did not taint the accuracy or impartiality of the trier of fact's decision, a strong argument can be made that the defendant was given a
70
fair trial.
Misapplication of the exclusionary rule71 fits the paradigm of an error that, although common, has little impact on the correctness of the
trial result. The exclusionary rule has a long tradition in the federal
system 7 2 and error in its application requires reversal even if the evidence underlying the conviction is unquestionably reliable. 78 This aspect of the rule has drawn immense criticism, 74 which intensified after
the rule was extended to the states.75 Many courts have echoed Cardozo's dissatisfaction with the idea that, although the untainted evi09 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968), quoting Lutwak v. United States,
344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).
70 The countervailing point, of course, is that in determining whether an error is harmless, appellate courts may make mistakes and send innocent men to jail. The use of the
overwhelming evidence standard, and the limiting of the harmless error rule to rights not
vielded as fundamental to the basic accuracy and fairness of the judicial process, however,
limit this objection.
71 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
72 It was devised and applied to the federal courts in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914).
73 See, e.g., Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm.L.
REv. 665 (1970).
74 Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People
vs. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 565 (1955); Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CoaimNu
L.Q. 337 (1939); Waite, Evidence-Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence, 42 MICH. L. REv.
679 (1944); Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.BA.J.
479 (1922).
75 See, e.g., Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mistake, 19 DEPAUL L. REv. 80
(1969); Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAIF. L. REv.
929, 951-56 (1965); LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule
(pts. I & 2), 30 Mo. L. REV. 391, 566 (1965); LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police:
The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REv.
987 (1965); Oaks, supra note 73; Schaefer, The Fourteenth Amendment and Sanctity of the
Person, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1969).

The University of Chicago Law Review

(41:616

dence supports the conviction, "the criminal is to go free because the
76
constable has blundered."
In Chapman, Justice Stewart noted that there was a long tradition of
no harmless constitutional error but suggested that in the case of the
exclusionary rule the "interests of judicial economy might well dictate
a harmless-error rule for such violations." 77 Many lower courts had reviewed the violation by the harmless error rule 78 before Chapman,
and the Court has apparently agreed that harmless error is the proper
standard.7 9
Occasionally judicial concern with preventing unnecessary retrials
competes with other aspects of judicial economy. For example, one of
the rationales of the Mirandas0 warnings was to expedite judicial administration by precluding lengthy investigations into the voluntariness of statements given to the police. If Mirandaviolations were treated
as coerced confessions and met with automatic reversal, this shortcut
would be realized. Opportunities for Miranda violations are present,
however, in nearly every criminal case, and can easily occur even when
the statements given are completely voluntary. Lower courts have favored avoidance of retrials over the certainty provided by the use of
8
automatic reversal in reviewing violations of the Miranda rule. ' Although it is premature to conclude that Mirandawarnings use the harmless error rule, the Supreme Court will probably follow the lower
82
courts' lead.
The problem of frequently recurring technical violations is especially
acute when a newly announced protection is applied retroactively.
When prior convictions are used at a subsequent trial and are then
retroactively held unconstitutional, their use becomes a violation bePeople v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
386 U.S. 18, 44 n.2 (1967).
78 See Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 128 (1970) (listing cases).
79 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53 (1970). The Court said that if the admission of evidence seized from defendant's house was error, it was harmless under Har76
77

rington.
80 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
81 Sample v. Eyman, 469 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1972); Whitsell v. Perini, 419 F.2d 95,
96 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Smith, 418 F.2d 223, 224 (6th Cir. 1969); Guyette v.
State 84 Nev. 160, 438 P.2d 244 (1968); cf. Application of Guyette, 38 F. Supp. 1069 (D.
Nev. 1972); States v. Bliss, 238 A.2d 848 (Del. 1968).
82 See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972). In that case the Supreme Court did
not decide whether statements made to a police spy in defendant's cell were taken in
violation of Miranda, on the ground that even if a violation had occurred, it would have
been harmless. At least one court of appeals has read the decision to mean that Miranda
warnings use the harmless error rule. United States v. Faulkenbery, 472 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 411 US. 970 (1973).
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cause of their prior invalidity. s8 The Court in United States v. Tucker84
faced a case where a prior conviction, only later held unconstitutional,
had been used (when still valid) to increase a punishment. The Court
did not require automatic reversal and found the error not harmless;
the dissenters wished to find the error harmless on the grounds that
other evidence in the record was sufficient to support the sentence imposed. 85

III.
A.

A

TEST FOR AUTOMATIC REVERSAL

Formulation of a Test

For a guarantee to be considered appropriate for the automatic reversal standard of review, it must be substantially fundamental, as
manifested by the three indicia already discussed. Otherwise no amount
of deterrent value could justify the social cost of retrial and inaccurate
results, and the harmless error standard would be appropriate. If the
right is substantially fundamental, the deterrent value of automatic reversal must be weighed against its social cost. Violations of a fundamental right should be reviewed under the harmless error standard only
if this assessment suggests that automatic reversal would be extremely
costly compared to a marginal deterrent value. Because of the long
tradition of automatically reversing all constitutional errors, there is a
presumption against the harmless error standard, and a strong case must
be made for invoking it.
B.

Applications of the Test

1. Impartial Trier of Fact. A defendant is constitutionally entitled
to an impartial trier of fact. This guarantee has two components, an
impartial judge in a bench trial and an impartial jury in a jury trial,
which must be analyzed separately.
The guarantee of an impartial judge is not explicit, although it
might be implied from Article III. The right has, however, been guaranteed in the federal courts by statute since 1911, 6 and in 1927 was
held to be an essential element of fundamental fairness.87 The expres83 Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967).

84 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
85 Similarly, the use of an invalid prior conviction to impeach a witness has been held
a violation of due process. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972). It is judged by the harmless
error rule and is harmless when the witness is sufficiently impeached by other evidence.
United States v. Faulkenbery, 472 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970 (1973).
86 28 U.S.C. § 24 (1940), now, 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970). Prior to 1948, the statute applied

only to federal judges, and was then amended to include Supreme Court justices. See Evans
v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 247-48 (1920), for a qualification of the judicial impartiality problem

when there is only one proper tribunal and it has an interest.
87 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
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sion of congressional intent and the historical tradition of this right
strongly suggest its fundamentality. The deterrent value of the protection is also strong, because the behavior to be controlled is the behavior
of trial judges,"" who are easily monitored by appellate courts, sensitive
to reversal for error, and expected to understand the criteria established
as constitutional requirements.
For this violation the factors that weigh against automatic reversal
are weak. A judge who commits the error of hearing a case in which he
holds a personal interest in conviction or animosity towards the defendant should not be considered capable of an objective consideration'
of the evidence. Reversal, therefore, woulld not adversely affect the policy of respecting accurate trial results whenever possible. The error is
not likely to be common in the absence of a deliberate decision to hear
inappropriate cases.
The guarantee of an impartial jury rests on explicit language in the
Constitution,8 9 and bars from service jurors who have a direct interest
in or knowledge of the case. Jurors who have knowledge of the facts
and have framed an opinion as to the issue to be tried, 90 or have some
personal reason for prejudice towards the defendant 9 ' have been the
classic examples of jury bias requiring reversal.
The strong fundamentality of the right is complemented by the additional deterrence that automatic reversal on this error would provide.
As in the case of protection against bias in bench trials, the guarantee
of an impartial jury depends chiefly on the trial judge, who, for the
reasons already discussed, can be expected to respond to reversal by
intensifying his efforts to detect and avoid violations of the rights.
Reversal for jury bias is as necessary to accurate trial results as is reversal for judicial bias. The fact-finding process is undefinined when
jury prejudice perverts an objective view of the evidence. Many of the
violations of the right are far from technical, for example, discriminatorily chosen venire. 92 Insofar as violations of the right to an impartial jury are to be inferred from the judge's failure to ask certain
questions on voir dire 9 3-for example, questions on possible race prej88 See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970).
89 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ......
90 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154-57 (1879).
91 Lett v. United States, 15 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1926) (reversible error to retain jurors
who previously convicted defendant's wife on the same offense); cf. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
92 Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
93 In Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973), the Court held that it was a violation
of due process for a judge to refuse to question jurors on voir dire as to possible racial
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udice-technical violations are possible. Nevertheless, the questions
that are required are clear and easily understood by the judiciary. The
right does not give rise to inadvertent violations such as may occur
with regard to certain prosecutorial comments.9 4 On balance, the strong
fundamentality of the right and its heavy deterrent value make a firm
case for automatic reversal, and considerations of accuracy also seem
to warrant that standard.
2. PrejudicialPublicity. Pervasive publicity that permeates the environment of a criminal trial with hostility towards the defendant
and disturbs the "judicial serenity and calm" 95 to which he is entitled
has been held a denial of due process. This procedural safeguard is in
effect an extension of the right to an impartial trier of fact-it protects
the trier of fact from undue external influences. The constitutional
protection from prejudicial publicity applies to pre-trial publicity, 96
publicity during trial,9 7 and distracting behavior of media in the courtroom itself.98 It may be violated without a showing of actual prejudice. 99
This guarantee lacks a strong showing of fundamentality. It has no
explicit constitutional origin, but rather is derived from Anglo-American concepts of appropriate decorum. The historical development of
constitutional safeguards shows this one to be of recent vintage. The
protection from excessive publicity first appeared as a supervisory rule
prejudice, even though on appeal no actual showing of prejudice was made. The Seventh
Circuit, following Ham, rejected a contention that a similar failure to quiz jurors could
be harmless error when evidence was overwhelming as to guilt and five of the twelve
jurors were of the defendant's race; United States v. Booker, 480 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1973).
See also United States v. Robinson, 485 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Robinson,
466 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Carter, 440 F.2d 1132 (6th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Gore, 435 F.2d 1110 (4th Cir. 1970). Contra, United States v. Grant, No. 73-1746,
2d Cir., Apr. 1, 1974. Similarly, where appeals are made by the prosecutor to race prejudice
in jury trials, it has been suggested that such remarks can never be harmless error. United
States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 350 F. Supp. 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d
152 (2d Cir. 1973).
94 For example, prosecutorial remarks implying that the defendant had offered to plead
guilty to a lesser offense, followed by the trial court's specific disapproving instructions,
have been held not to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Donnelley v. DeChristoforo, 42 U.S.L.W. 4682 (U.S. May 13, 1974).
95 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965).
96 The Court stressed the pretrial publicity element in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333 (1966). See The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARv. L. Rv. 125, 182-85 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as The 1965 Term] for an analysis of the Sheppard case and its relation
to prior decisions.
97 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
98 Id. at 542-44.
99 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351-55 (1966). In earlier decisions, an indication
of prejudice was required. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Stroble v. California, 343
U.S. 181 (1952).
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for federal courts in Marshall v. United States,100 and was applied to
the states as a constitutional rule in Rideau v. Louisiana10 1 and Estes
02
v. Texas.
In addition to its weak fundamentality, this guarantee casts upon
the courts the burden of administering rules that are difficult to formulate and unlikely to be effective deterrents. A court's attempt to deter
the media from overstepping the bounds of what the court considers
legitimate comment may come into conflict with the first amendment
and the defendant's right to a "public trial." The Supreme Court has
stated that no court in the American constitutional system has the
power "to suppress, edit or censor events which transpire in proceedings
before it."103
Thus the factors for automatic reversal status are weak. Moreover,
the effect on the policy of preserving accurate trial results is substantial.
Any case that is even locally "notorious" is susceptible to an intense
media saturation, and therefore claims of violation would very likely
be common. The defendant need not show any actual prejudice; thus if
this guarantee were given automatic reversal status it could soon come
to overturn an excessive number of convictions. The social cost would
be augmented by the possibility of excessive restrictions on the press,
and judicial concern with conservation of resources would be aroused
by the possibility that, in a case of legitimately great public interest,
on retrial the same media activity might occur. The more socially significant a case, the more "untriable" it would become. Against all of
these cost factors, the only consideration that might weigh for automatic reversal is concern that the publicity did impermissibly influence
the trier of fact. If the defendant can show actual prejudice 04 on the
part of the trier of fact, however, he can claim that his right to impartiality was violated and void the conviction under the automatic
reversal standard. 0 5 The publicity safeguard operates when no claim
of actual prejudice can be made, and when the evidence is overwhelming for guilt, it can be assumed that the publicity is not likely to have
swayed the jury. If the evidence in a case is unclear, the harmless error
rule would, of course, require reversal. In light of this comparison of
100 360 U.S. 310, 313 (1959).
101 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
102 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
103 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (Douglas, J.). Mr. Justice Black, because of
his great concern for an absolute first amendment, often dissented in the publicity cases.
See The 1965 Term, supra note 96, at 182-85.
104 E.g., in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), two-thirds of the jurors on voir dire
expressed belief in defendant's guilt. See also text and note at note 99 supra.
105 See text and notes at notes 89-95 supra.
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factors, the harmless error standard ought to apply in cases in which
there is no proof of a prejudiced trier of fact.1 6
3. Statements by a Co-Defendant. It is a constitutional violation for
the state to introduce, in a joint trial, a statement by one defendant that
implicates a co-defendant if the co-defendant refuses to take the stand
and be subjected to cross-examination. This rule is a derivative safeguard inferred from the confrontation clause and thus is not very explicit. Traditionally the Court has not viewed the right as fundamental.
Until the Court held this error incurable in 1968,107 a cautionary
jury instruction to disregard the statement as it applied to the defendant was sufficient to cure the error. 0 8 Congress has not spoken on
the subject except insofar as it continues to provide for joint trials.
Thus the fundamentality of the right is not strong. Occasionally the
revelation of the co-defendant's statement is spontaneous on the part
of the testifying witness, and in such cases the futility of deterrence and
the importance of conserving judicial resources warrant application
of the harmless error rule. On the other hand, introduction of the codefendant's implicating statement-whether by testimonial or documentary evidence-is usually deliberate and thus could be deterred.
In no case, however, can the prosecutor foresee whether the co-defendant
will take the stand. The automatic reversal standard would force the
prosecutor to choose between foregoing-joint trials or running a significant risk of reversal for an inadvertent error that, if there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, is unlikely to affect the
accurate measurement of the other evidence sufficiently to cause an incorrect result.
The right to have a trial free from incriminating statements of a
co-defendant who is not available for cross-examination thus is of weak
fundamentality, and the factors favoring the use of the harmless error
standard are strong, suggesting that harmless error is the appropriate"
108 The Sixth Circuit seems to be the only drcuit to have spoken on the question and
it has applied the harmless error standard. United States v. Cimini, 427 F.2d 129, 130 (6th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Barnes, 383 F.2d 287, 295 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1040 (1967). In a related question, circuit courts have declared that it may be a violation
of due process to try a defendant in prison garb. Bentley v. Crist, 469 F.2d 854 (9th Cir.
1972); Watt v. Page, 452 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1070 (1972); Hernandez
v. Beto, 443 F.2d 634 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 897 (1971). So far the courts of ap-

peals have judged this violation by the harmless error rule, using the opportunity to lecture the lower court but affirming the convictions. See, e.g., Thomas v. Beto, 474 F.2d 981
(5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Moye, 487 F.2d 1399 (4th Cir. 1973) (decision without pub-

lished opinion), Nos. 73-1489, 4th Cir., Nov. 28, 1973).
107 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
108 Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957).

The University of Chicago Law Review

standard. This has, indeed, been the standard used by the courts to
review violations of this right. 10 9
CONCLUSION

The harmless error rule is a judicial attempt to harmonize the often
conflicting policies that underlie criminal laws and constitutional safeguards in the trial process. The advantages of this less rigid posture will
be wasted, however, unless the lower courts are able to find guidance
for the choice of which standard to apply. This comment has suggested
some guiding principles that seem both appropriate and implicit in the
Supreme Court's present approach. The courts should analyze the
fundamentality of the safeguards by examining their explicit constitutional support, legislative reinforcement, and historical weight. If this
inquiry suggests that a right is fundamental, automatic reversal is appropriate unless the balancing of factors shows that automatic reversal
would place an extremely high price on a minimal increase in constitutional protection.
Robert Pondolfi
109 Bruton errors are judged by the harmless error standard. Brown v. United States,
411 U.S. 223, 231 (1973); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74, 93 (1970) (Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J., concurring); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S.
250 (1969); Stubbs v. Wainright, 468 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1972); Olivas v. State of A3rizona ex
rel. Eyman, 447 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1971); Hamilton v. United States, 433 F.2d 526 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, sub nom. Klein v. United States, 402 U.S. 944 (1971); United States v.
Davis, 418 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1969); Simpson v. Wainwright, 439 F.2d 948 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 1011 (1971); Drapeau v. May, 350 F. Supp. 1321 (D.C. Idaho 1972).

